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those submerged lands.
Turning to the first question, the Supreme Court recognized that
Idaho had conceded that its earlier agreements with the Tribe
included submerged lands. In addition, the Supreme Court agreed
with the findings of the district court, and noted that the right to
control the lake bed and adjacent waters was traditionally important to
the Tribe because their livelihood depended on fishing. Thus, an
acreage determination of the reserved area in 1883 necessarily
included the area of the lake bed. Given Idaho's concession and the
district court's findings, the Supreme Court found that Congress
clearly intended to include the submerged lands in the reservation to
the Tribe.
Turning to the second question, the Supreme Court recognized
that Idaho had conceded that an 1888 report by the Secretary of the
Interior regarding the scope of the reservation included all the
navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene. In addition, the Supreme
Court noted that: (1) the United States could avoid hostilities between
white settlers and the Tribe only by agreeing to a reservation that
included submerged lands, (2) Congress dealt and negotiated in a fair
manner with the Tribe to fulfill that objective, (3) that Congress
ratified the agreements without any language indicating the
submerged lands had passed to Idaho upon its statehood, and (4) such
agreements included the sale of lands within the reservation to others
with the compensation going directly to the Tribe. Given Idaho's
concession and the district court's findings, the Supreme Court found
that Congress clearly intended to defeat the future state of Idaho's title
to the submerged lands.
Matthewj Costinett
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (holding that Colorado is liable
to Kansas for monetary damages and prejudgment interest dating back
to 1985 for Colorado's violation of the Arkansas River Compact).
Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact ("Compact")
between Colorado and Kansas in 1949. The Compact provided, inter
alia, that future development in the river basin could not materially
deplete the usable quantity or availability of water to other users. In
1986, Kansas invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. The Court granted
Kansas leave to file a complaint and appointed a Special Master.. The
Special Master's first report recommended the Court find that
Colorado's post-Compact groundwater pumping had materially
depleted the waters in violation of Compact Article lV-D. The Court
remanded the case to the Special Master to determine the appropriate
remedy. The Special Master's second report recommended an award
of damages, to which Colorado filed exceptions. The Court overruled
Colorado's exceptions without prejudice and remanded the case to the
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Special Master for a more specific remedy.
The Special Master's third report recommended that damages be
measured by Kansas' losses, rather than by Colorado's profits, that the
damages be paid in money rather than water, and that damages
include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of the judgment.
The initial estimate of damages totaled $62,369,173. Of that amount,
approximately $9.2 million represented direct and indirect losses, $12
million was attributable to inflation, and $41 million comprised
interest. Colorado filed four objections and Kansas filed one objection
to the report. Colorado contended: (1) the Eleventh Amendment
barred an award of damages; (2) the damages award should not
include prejudgment interest; (3) the amount of interest awarded was
excessive; and (4) Kansas improperly calculated crop production
losses. Kansas objected that prejudgment interest should be paid from
1950, the date of the first Compact violation, rather than 1969.
The Court overruled Colorado's first objection and held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude recovery of damages when a
State acts in its own interest rather than as an agent or trustee for its
citizens. Furthermore, when a state properly invokes the Court's
jurisdiction, neither the measure of damages, the method for
calculating damages, nor the state's post-judgment decisions regarding
the use of the money can retrospectively negate the Court's
jurisdiction.
The Court dismissed Colorado's second objection, that
prejudgment interest could not be applied to an unliquidated claim, as
an unsound common-law distinction between liquidated and
unliquidated claims. The Court pointed out that since 1933, they have
consistently held that an injured party is not fully compensated for
damages without adding interest for the delay in obtaining the award.
They agreed with the Special Master that the unliquidated nature of
Kansas' damages, in and of itself, does not bar an award of prejudgment interest.
Next, Colorado objected to both the interest rate adopted and the
date from which it accrued. Colorado argued that the Special Master
improperly used the higher rates available to individual farmers, rather
than the lower interest rates available to the state. However, the Court
felt the rates available to individual farmers provided a better remedy
for the economic consequences of Colorado's breach because it
reflected the farmers' cost of borrowing. The Court also agreed with
the Special Master that the equities of the case did not support
awarding pre-judgment interest from 1950. Furthermore, given the
uncertain scope of damages between 1968 and 1985, and the fact that
it was up to Kansas to initiate proceedings to quantify damages, the
Court agreed with Colorado that denying pre-judgment interest for
that period was reasonable. Thus, the Court overruled Kansas'
exception that interest should accrue from 1950 and Colorado's
exception challenging the recommended interest rates; however the
Court sustained Colorado's objection to the award of interest prior to
1985.
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Colorado's final objection challenged the value of crop losses
attributable to the Compact violations. The parties disagreed over how
much additional yield the missing water would have produced.
Kansas' experts relied on a hypothesis of a linear relationship between
water and crop yields, with an estimated reduction in yield due to
environmental factors. Colorado's expert proposed a competing
model, but had to withdraw it when confronted with flaws in his data.
Thus, the Court overruled Colorado's objection because Colorado was
unable to successfully challenge Kansas' experts and provide a
plausible alternative cost estimate.
The Court remanded the case to the Special Master for
preparation of a final judgment specifying the amount of damages that
Colorado must pay.
John A. Helfrich
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Pepperell Assoc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 246 F.3d
15 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding the Environmental Appeals Board's
decision unreviewable, based on the record's substantial evidence).
Pepperell Associates ("Pepperell") operated a small business,
which accidentally released 350 gallons of oil into United States
navigable waterways. After the spill, the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") brought a three-count administrative penalty action.
Both parties appealed the Administrative LawJudges' ("ALJ") decision
to the Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"). Pepperell petitioned
for judicial review of the EAB's decision in the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. However, the court refused the petition
because EAB based its decision on the records' substantial evidence.
Pepperell asserted four issues for review. First, Pepperell argued its
facility was not subject to the Clean Water Act's ("CWA") Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasures ("SPCC") regulations
because the location made it unreasonable to foresee a discharge into
navigable waters. Second, Pepperell argued that between November 1,
1996 and July 14, 1997, SPCC regulations did not apply to it because its
underground oil capacity was less than SPCC'sjurisdictional threshold.
Third, Pepperell argued that its 20,000 gallon, aboveground storage
tank created a new feature, and thus was not a modification. Finally,
Pepperell claimed EAB miscalculated the penalty.
The court explained that EAB was entitled to substantial deference
if it followed its own procedures and met statutory requirements. The
court would only set aside EAB's findings if the record, taken as a

